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2012

Wells Fargo's targeted-by-design subprime lending

US — South
Wells Fargo's targeted-by-design subprime lending

In July 2012, the US Department of Justice and Wells Fargo entered into a $175 million settlement over discriminatory subprime mortgage lending. The complaint and accompanying internal documents established that, between 2004 and 2009, Wells Fargo loan officers had referred Black and Latino borrowers to subprime mortgage products at higher rates than white borrowers with similar credit profiles, and had charged Black and Latino borrowers higher fees and rates on prime loans.

Internal company communications cited in the consent order referred to subprime products marketed to minority neighborhoods as 'ghetto loans' and to Black borrowers as 'mud people.' The consent decree was the largest fair-lending settlement in DOJ history at the time; comparable settlements with Countrywide Financial ($335 million, 2011) and Bank of America followed.

Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor's ``Race for Profit`` (2019) and Baradaran both treat the subprime-targeting record as the contemporary expression of the two-track credit system: federal regulation of the mortgage market allowed predatory products to be sold preferentially in neighborhoods shaped by earlier redlining, and the resulting 2008 foreclosure wave erased a substantial share of the Black homeownership gains of the previous twenty years.

The Wells Fargo subprime-mortgage litigation of 2012 was the result of a multi-year federal Department of Justice investigation into the bank's lending practices during the subprime-mortgage expansion of 2004 to 2008. The investigation produced evidence that Wells Fargo had systematically steered qualified Black and Latino borrowers into subprime mortgage products even where the borrowers' creditworthiness qualified them for the bank's standard prime mortgage products. The bank settled in July 2012 for approximately 175 million dollars, distributed to approximately 34,000 affected borrowers.

The investigative record identified specific operational mechanisms. Wells Fargo's mortgage-origination workforce had operated under compensation structures that paid substantially higher commissions on subprime loans than on prime loans. Loan officers had used 'mortgage broker' and 'retail' channels in ways that produced racially disparate outcomes: Black and Latino borrowers were substantially more likely to be routed through the broker channel, which produced higher rates of subprime placement, while white borrowers were substantially more likely to be routed through the retail channel, which produced higher rates of prime placement.

The empirical evidence on the broader pattern is substantial. Bocian, Ernst, and Li (Center for Responsible Lending, 2008) analyzed approximately 177,000 subprime mortgages and found that Black and Latino borrowers were approximately thirty percent more likely to receive subprime loans than comparably qualified white borrowers. The Federal Reserve's analysis of 2006 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data identified similar patterns. The downstream effects on the 2007-2010 foreclosure crisis have been substantially documented: the Center for Responsible Lending estimated that Black homeowners lost approximately 240 billion dollars in home equity through foreclosure between 2007 and 2010.

The federal regulatory response has produced substantial subsequent rule-making. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which has substantial enforcement authority under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. The CFPB's enforcement actions against mortgage lenders under the post-2010 framework have produced substantial settlements addressing both individual lending-practice violations and systemic racial-disparate patterns. The Bureau's regulatory rule-making has expanded the data-collection requirements under HMDA, providing more granular data on the racial demographics of mortgage origination by lender and by geography.

The cumulative impact on the modern racial wealth gap has been substantial. The Federal Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances data document that the Black-white wealth gap, which had been approximately ten-to-one in the late 1990s, expanded to approximately thirteen-to-one in the post-crisis years and has not subsequently closed. The platform's framing treats the Wells Fargo case as one of the principal documented instances of the broader pattern of racial-disparate operation of the mortgage-origination system during the subprime-expansion years.

The federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) enforcement framework that emerged from the Dodd-Frank Act has produced substantial subsequent settlements addressing racial-disparate operation of the mortgage-origination system. The CFPB's enforcement actions against Hudson City Bancorp (2015), Bancorp South (2016), Klein Bank (2018), Townstone Financial (2020), and successive subsequent actions have addressed both individual lending-practice violations and systemic racial-disparate patterns. The cumulative enforcement activity has produced substantial documented changes in the operational practice of the affected institutions and substantial documentary infrastructure on the contemporary scale of racial-disparate operation in the broader mortgage-origination industry.

The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data infrastructure, expanded by the 2018 CFPB rule-making, provides substantially more granular data on the racial demographics of mortgage origination than the pre-2018 framework had provided. The expanded data has supported subsequent CFPB enforcement actions, supported subsequent academic research on the contemporary mortgage-origination landscape, and supported subsequent fair-lending litigation by private plaintiffs. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) modernization rule of 2023 expands the CRA examination framework's data-collection requirements in ways that incorporate the expanded HMDA data infrastructure into the CRA examination practice. The platform's pathways pages cover the principal CFPB intake routes for fair-lending complaints.

Primary source

United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 1:12-cv-01150 (D.D.C., consent order July 12, 2012). See Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, ``Race for Profit`` (UNC Press, 2019).

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